Introduction to corruption in the Persian Gulf
Corruption, in some form or another, has existed since the earliest emergence of structured social organizations. Given the diversity of socio-economic and governance characteristics throughout the world, large diff erences exist in the level and typology of corruption. Moreover, researchers and institutions have defi ned corruption from diff erent perspectives as they attempt to capture this diversity. Diff erences in the manifestation of corruption are particularly salient between developing and developed advanced economies. This becomes even more pronounced where there is a valuable and exhaustible national resource, such as oil or natural gas.
In this book, we discuss the impact of oil and gas endowment on the Persian Gulf oil-exporting countries (PGOEC). 1 In Chapter 1, we discuss the nature of corruption and provide an introduction to its manifestations in the PGOEC. This chapter is divided into two parts: Part I provides an overview of some of the challenges in defi ning and measuring corruption; while Part II provides both a descriptive and analytical account of corruption in these countries. In Chapter 2, we focus on the treatment of corruption in Islam. Chapter 3 contains a review of the causes and consequences of corruption. In Chapter 4, we look at the impact of oil and gas dependency on corruption, and in Chapter 5, we examine the impact of corruption on economic growth and the role of the petroleum sector in the economies of the Persian Gulf. Finally, in Chapter 6, we examine the relationship of corruption, the natural resource curse and intergenerational equity, and off er an approach for transforming the curse into a blessing.
international and government organizations, but there are a rapidly growing number of private market sector defi nitions of corruption that now serve as global indicators. Since the early 1990s, when corruption was seen as an important factor in international development and economics discourse, those working in the fi eld and studying the issue have debated its precise defi nition. Perhaps the most widely cited defi nition and the one with the broadest consensus is 'the misuse of public offi ce for private gain' (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997: 419; Treisman, 2000: 399). In addition, international organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and in some instances the World Bank use this defi nition to guide their own program of work in addressing corruption. Many argue that according to this conventional characterization of corruption, the public domain is distinctly separated from the private sector; in addition, public sector actors are the primary perpetrators, and corruption is universally for private gain or based on selfi sh motives. Moreover, the term misused (or the term abuse as used in some cases) generally implies the application of some kind of legal standard.
However, while this may be the most widely cited defi nition, questions have emerged about the scope and precision of this defi nition. For instance, some have argued that the defi nition of corruption should be expanded to include private sector actors rather then just those in the public sphere, and should necessarily include violations of certain norms beyond the legal standard. Moreover, while some contend that its scope should be broadened to take into consideration the various socio-cultural aspects of the phenomenum, others argue that a defi nition that is more limited in scope and standardized better serves the needs of researchers. Jain (2001: 73) sheds light on the importance of how corruption is defi ned when stating that although it may seem to be a simple issue of semantics, how corruption is defi ned provides the basis for what researchers choose to model and measure. Moreover, how corruption gets defi ned or conceptualized will ultimately guide the direction of anti-corruption legislation and other eff orts to combat corruption.
Until recently, each multilateral agency had its own perspective and mechanism to measure, rank and record corruption. However, in early 2006, an International Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force was established by the major multilateral institutions (African Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank Group, Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group) in order to establish a consistent and harmonized approach to combat corruption in the activities and operations of member institutions. They jointly endorsed the following common principles and guidelines for investigations conducted by their respective inspection units: 2 It was agreed upon that: 'critical to the success of a harmonized approach is a common understanding of the practices prohibited'. Hence the Task Force, in principle, 3 agreed to the following 'standardized defi nitions of fraudulent and corrupt practices' for investigating such practices in activities fi nanced by the member institutions: 1) A corrupt practice -is the off ering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to infl uence improperly the actions of another party. 2) A fraudulent practice -is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a fi nancial or other benefi t or to avoid an obligation. 3) A coercive practice -is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to infl uence improperly the actions of a party. 4) A collusive practice -is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including infl uencing improperly the actions of another party. 4 This work has complimented the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Anti-bribery Convention signed by 38 countries. 5 The OECD Working Group on Bribery examines acts of bribery involving foreign political parties, candidates for foreign public offi ce, and foreign subsidiaries, among others. In addition, it also pays 'particular attention to the use of off -shore fi nancial centers, private sector bribery, solicitation, whistleblower protection and practices that block eff ective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases'. 6 The OECD's general view on corruption is stated as follows: 'corruption is typically the outcome of a dysfunctional governance system in which the linkages between the various institutional elements operate or malfunction in particular ways'. Most commonly, it defi nes corruption as the 'abuse of public offi ce for private gain', or for the gain of particular groups (for example, a political party or an informal patronage network). The OECD, however, does not view corruption and weak governance as synonymous with one another. 7 The World Bank has perhaps been the most visible multilateral voice speaking out against corruption. It argues that corruption deserves special attention because it works in 'insidious ways' as it tends to undermine the fabric of political, economic and social life. Corruption, as defi ned by the World Bank is:
the abuse of public offi ce for private gain. This private gain could be in the form of money or favors for the benefi t of family or friends -or for the benefi t of special interest groups such as a political party seeking to obtain or retain power. Such behavior by persons concerned with the procurement process often leads to economic losses for the public. Thus, many lose for the benefi t of a few. 8 According to the World Bank: 'governance refers to the manner in which public offi cials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services. Corruption is one outcome of poor governance, involving the abuse of public offi ce for private gain'. 9 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defi nes the term governance as to: encompass all aspects of the way a country is governed, including its economic policies and regulatory framework. Corruption is a narrower concept, which is often defi ned as the abuse of public authority or trust for private benefi t. The Fund views theses two concepts as closely linked . . . an environment characterized by poor governance off ers greater incentives and more scope for corruption. Many of the causes of corruption are economic in nature, and so are its consequences -poor governance clearly is detrimental to economic activity and welfare. Because of their economic nature, issues related to governance and corruption often falls [sic] directly within the mandate and expertise of the IMF.
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The Asian Development Bank (ADB) Anticorruption Policy and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) both defi ne corrupt and fraudulent practices under very similar terms (and similar to International Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force) as follows: 1) Corrupt practice -the off ering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, anything of value to improperly infl uence the actions of another party (e.g. bribery, kickbacks, extortion, bid manipulation). 2) Fraudulent practice -any action, including misrepresentation, to obtain a fi nancial or other benefi t by deception (e.g. fraudulent claims like consultant timesheet, airfare, receipts/invoices; using lower rate personnel to perform work at higher rates; providing lower quality goods; false documents like curriculum vitae, bid security/bank guarantees, work certifi cates, fi nancial statements, fi ctitious bids/ 'borrowing' names of fi rms; misrepresentation of educational background or full-time employment status). 3) Collusive practice -an arrangement between two or more parties designed to improperly infl uence the actions of another party (e.g. leaking of bid information, rigged specifi cations). 4) Coercive practice -impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or its property to improperly infl uence the actions of that party. 5) Confl ict of interest -a situation in which a party has interests that could improperly infl uence that party's performance of its offi cial duties or responsibilities, contractual obligations, or compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The World Trade Organization's (WTO) view on corruption, as to be expected, takes on a trade-slanted defi nition. An example of the broad range of issues the WTO squeezes under corruption are those that are trade-related barriers, that is, quotas, since they restrict imports or exports (limit supply) and they can artifi cially raise prices, creating abnormally large profi ts (that is, quota rent). It is the WTO's view that those profi ts can be used to infl uence policies, that is, lobbying, which for example can infl uence and provide opportunities for corruption in the allocation of quotas. The WTO also considers 'transparency, such as, making available to the public all information on trade regulations, other aspects of trade facilitation, clearer criteria for regulations dealing with the safety and standards of products, and non-discrimination also help by reducing the scope for arbitrary decision-making and cheating'. 12 In principle, the WTO considers corruption an economic act through the supply and demand mechanism, that is:
supply side corruption emanates from contractors seeking to bribe or collude in some way with government offi cials willing to take advantage of an opportunity off ered to them . . . [while] demand side corruption involves resources sought to enrich the government offi cial in some way or to sustain a political position or party outside of accepted means. 13 The United Nations under its UN Development Programme (UNDP) in its July 1998 report, 'Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance', defi ned corruption as: 'the misuse of public power, offi ce or authority for private benefi t -through bribery, extortion, infl uence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement. Although corruption is often considered a sin of government and public servants, it also prevails in the private sector.' 14 There are many other noteworthy multilateral institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and regional institutions such as the European Union (Convention on the Fight Against Corruption), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), European Central Bank (ECB, and the Council of Europe Anti-corruption Evaluations that also are pushing forward their own specifi c defi nitions of corruption. The major defi nitions and types of corruption as identifi ed by some of the leading institutions in the fi eld are summarized in Table 1 .1.
Measuring Corruption
Attempting to defi ne and measure corruption across comparable countries is already a challenging endeavor. It is even more problematic to design a The bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.
Transparency International
Corruption is one outcome of poor governance, involving the abuse of public offi ce for private gain
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Corruption is an outcome of a dysfunctional governance system in which the linkages between the various institutional elements operate or malfunction in particular ways. Corruption is defi ned as the 'abuse of public offi ce for private gain', or for the gain of particular groups (for example, a political party or an informal patronage network). Corruption and weak governance are not synonymous, however.
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Petty (or street-level) corruption
Petty corruption is most likely to confront people in their daily lives and be most immediately damaging for the poor. Critical to changing the structural context for corruption. 
Indices developed by private political risk fi rms
The fi rst type of indicator, primarily designed by private risk assessment fi rms, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and Political Risk Services (PRS), collect data from a network of correspondents with country-specifi c expertise, in addition to using business surveys and other quantitative sources of data. By assessing the relative incidence of corrupt transaction, PSR's International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption indicator is purported to capture the likelihood that high-level government authorities will extract illegal payments and the extent to which such payments are expected to exist throughout the government hierarchy. 16 Since most subscribers are typically private sector actors (banks, multinational corporations and international investors), these rating systems, as to be expected, focus primarily on issues of corruption most pertinent to business and foreign investment, measuring the quality or attractiveness of the business environment and the degree to which business activity can be expected to involve corrupt or potentially illegal transactions. In the ICRG, corruption is measured as a single dimension in a broader index of political risk, which is a component of an overall risk rating. The index is based on a scale of 0-6 with a lower score representing that 'high government offi cials are likely to demand special payments' and 'illegal payments are generally expected throughout the lower levels of government' and the form of 'bribes connected to import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, policy, protection, or loans'. 17 Generally, the methodologies employed by these rating systems are far less transparent then those employed by advocacy groups.
Perception-based indices designed by advocacy groups
The second set of indicators, typically developed by advocacy groups such as Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank Institute (WBI), measure corruption based on a series of surveys, which are reported by the public at large and by business representatives. Some surveys focus on business leaders' direct experience with issues related to corruption, while others solicit their 'expert opinion' or perception of corruption in a particular country. Perception-based indicators are based on the assumption that the perception of a specifi c set of respondents (business leaders, public servants, and so on) is accurately correlated to levels or patterns of corruption. Similarly to indicators developed by private political risk fi rms, the scope of survey questions (and thereby the implicit defi nition of corruption) designed by advocacy groups also illicits responses most relevant to their constituents and their mission; whether it be to assess the need for technical assistance in the areas of governance, to determine a country's eligibility for international aid, or simply to raise international awareness of corruption.
The initial goal for the TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was to raise global awareness of corruption and to provide researchers with data for evaluating the causes and consequences of corruption. 18 It has emerged as the most popular quantitative indicator of cross-country corruption comparisons. The CPI ranks more than 150 countries on the perceived level of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. Unlike private sector risk analysis fi rms, TI's corruption index is not based on information from its own experts. Instead, it is constructed on the basis of a weighted average of between three and 16 sources from about nine diff erent organizations, depending on the country and available data. A score of 10 represents total absence of corruption in a country, while 0 indicates that a country is perceived as completely corrupt.
The World Bank Institute's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) has attempted to build on and improve on Transparency International's corruption measurement. Both organizations use a composite set of indices to develop a single standardized measurement. However, there are some important diff erences between these indicators. While the CPI requires that country ratings be based on at least three survey sources, the CCI requires only one source per country. Accordingly, it has employed a broader defi nition of corruption and includes most cross-country indices reporting rankings on some aspect of corruption. 19 Moreover, the designers of the Control of Corruption Index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi) argue that TI's approach presents some limitations, as the presence of select and minimal data is not randomly distributed. Therefore, those countries with the poorest institutional capacity, questionable mechanisms of governance, and perhaps the highest levels of corruption will most likely have the fewest sources of corruption ratings. The CCI is measured in units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
As to be expected, there have been a number of criticisms of these perception-based corruption indices. While the composite method may make for a more accurate index because measurement errors are likely to be minimized by aggregating data from multiple sources, 20 many professionals have criticized the methodology. Some of these indices are also more (or less) appropriate for measuring changes over time and comparisons between countries. As organizations periodically attempt to improve statistical methodology, such changes may ultimately limit cross-country and time-series comparability. Drawing comparisons between countries is further hampered because the number of sources and the sources of data themselves are often inconsistent across countries. Moreover, varying sources may measure diff erent dimensions of corruption and may defi ne corruption diff erently; composite indices therefore have no clear defi nition. Perhaps the most widely cited criticism of these indices is that they are based on subjective perception rather than on some sort of empirical evaluation of corruption. For instance, during periods of rapid economic growth due to high oil export revenues, respondents in oil-exporting countries may attribute the increased ease of doing business to decreased corruption. Similarly, increased media hype as a result of a government initiative to tackle corruption may in fact exacerbate the perception of corruption. However, it is clear that given the inherent insidiousness of corruption, an empirical rating system is not always possible, particularly on a large scale. Finally, while corruption may take diff erent forms (that is, petty corruption, a 'corrupt legal system' and so on), most corruption indices do not describe which forms of corruption may exist in a particular country.
Broad governance indicators thought to be related to corruption
The third category of indicators is also typically designed by advocacy organizations; with corruption, however, as a component of a broader set of governance indices. These indicators generally describe corruption as a function of institutional arrangements and government policies -such as the presence of institutional bureaucracy, business and regulatory environment, and economic, political and civil freedoms, and so on. While such indicators may not be a measure of corruption per se, to some the benefi ts of empirically driven data outweigh the usefulness of perceptionbased indices. Many have criticized governance indicators as representing cultural or political biases about how public institutions and systems of governance should be organized. Tables 1.2-1.4 summarize the various institutions that measure government, legal and political corruption.
Categories of Corruption
Research shows that corruption is manifested in diff erent shapes and forms in diff erent regions of the world, but typically with considerable overlap among regions. 21 One common category of corruption is usually known as organized or centralized or 'oligarchs' corruption. This tends to occur in countries with dictatorships, one-family rule, other forms of autocratic rulers and their associated group of family and elites. This organized form of corruption typically pursues de facto control of natural resources, fi nancial and investment institutions, property agencies and other specifi c sectors of the economy. A prime example of this type of organized or centralized corruption category existed in Indonesia under the Suharto government from 1967 to 1998.
Another common category of corruption, which can coexist with organized and centralized corruption, is what is commonly known as 'diff used' corruption. This form of corruption is demographically widespread and is usually undertaken by bureaucrats and civil servants from the highest to the lowest levels. Examples of such transactions are embedded in a broader set of activities, that is, those that favor various groups of privileged insiders, such as industrialists receiving favorable regulations, public employees receiving high salaries, job security and perks, certain localities favored by those in power. They tend to be manifested in very specifi c types of behaviors, such as: assessment and payment of various kinds of taxes and government fees; trying to receive everyday public services; protecting one's property rights, such as preventing an unauthorized occupation of one's property or getting a delinquent tenant evicted from one's property; a transaction between a food adulterer and an offi cial who is responsible for food safety; or even something as ordinary as getting a vehicle registered or a passport issued. Corruption of this kind is not centrally organized or coordinated in any signifi cant manner by actors, including the politicians, even though they usually share its proceeds.
PART II: AN INTRODUCTION TO CORRUPTION IN THE PERSIAN GULF
Manifestation of Corruption
In the second part of this chapter, we provide an overview of some of the manifestations of corruption, with a focus on the Persian Gulf oil exporters. Corruption becomes more pronounced the longer the same party or ruler remains in power. In the major Islamic oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf (PGOEC), continuous rule by the same party or ruler has been prevalent for decades and, in fact, in every case, except Iran and Iraq, since their formation as countries. 23 Even in the case of these two exceptions, longevity of rule has existed in other ways. For example, Iran claims that elections have changed governments, when in fact the religious clerics have been the backbone of the real power ever since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; and before that it was the Pahlavi dynasty from World War II on. In Iraq, the Baath Party held power for about 35 years.
Support for continuous rule in the PGOEC has come from diff erent sources. In both Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1979, the ruling classes have sought legitimacy through support from the religious establishment rather than from the population at large, that is, through free and open elections and an active civil society. In the smaller Persian Gulf oil-exporting countries (Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) governments have traditionally derived their authority through support not only from the religious establishment but also from the merchant class. However, in all these economies, to one degree or another, as oil has gained economic dominance in the economic system, the legitimacy of the ruling class has become closely associated with their ability to provide material well-being to citizens no matter how large the economic costs. 24 As such, it is not surprising that the form of political control in the PGOEC has ultimately been the decisive determinant of how oil revenues have been managed.
Although discussed in more depth in Chapter 2, on Islam and corruption, it is important to note that the relationship between Islam and corruption is particularly pertinent here as the entire region is an Islamic zone and generally perceived as the heart of Islam because of the location of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. It is general knowledge that corruption and corrupt practices are un-Islamic and are unambiguously condemned in the Quran. In Islam, individuals are expected to work hard for economic gain, compete in business, own private property, and share risks in investment. It was understood that economic and emotional strains of poverty may compel an individual to resort to unhealthy or unethical means of earning an income. Thus the principles of an Islamic economic system were formulated to ensure the availability of education and equal employment opportunity for all, poverty reduction and prevention, and continuous social and intellectual development for all individuals. 25 As such, one of the critical areas in gauging Islamic governments is the following: quality of policy formulation, equal opportunity for all, economic growth and prosperity, and economic justice. This is further reinforced by emphasis in Islam on wealth distribution. 26 Abbas Mirakhor has summarized the notion of equitable income succinctly in his statement:
Islam asserts unambiguously that poverty is neither caused by scarcity and paucity of natural resources, nor is due to the lack of proper synchronization between the mode of production and the relation of distribution, but as a result of waste, opulence, extravagance, and nonpayment of what rightfully belongs to the less able segments of the society. This position is illustrated by the Prophetic saying that: 'Nothing makes a poor man starve except that with which a rich person avails in luxury.
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Oil-related corruption in the Persian Gulf In the oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, the depletion of oil and gas has been a major source of income and wealth over the last 50 or so years and will most likely continue to be so for some time to come. Oil and gas resources are natural depletable resources and should, according to Islam, benefi t all citizens of this and future generations equally. Thus it is not unreasonable for the population to expect a more even distribution of wealth in these Islamic oil-and gas-exporting countries than in other countries because they rely heavily on oil and gas as a source of income. This, in fact, has been the foundation of the argument used by governments in the region to support their widely used socio-economic policy tool of heavily subsidizing the population (health, education, housing, and so on) using oil and gas revenues.
The most persistent allegations of corruption against the governments in the PGOEC has been that ruling public offi cials have for decades taken a portion, in some cases a signifi cant portion, of the oil wealth for personal use in addition to receiving their sanctioned stipends. Readily available data confi rm that oil and gas revenues constitute a signifi cant component of gross domestic product (GDP) as other non-petroleum and non-gas industries have played a relatively smaller part than in nonresourced based countries in the generation of GDP. It is because of the unique manner in which natural resources are conceived in Islam that this has become an issue for regional corruption experts. Although many of these governments have provided substantial infrastructure development and subsidized healthcare, housing, education and even jobs for decades, which are one way of sharing the oil and gas revenues amongst the population, this has not benefi ted all citizens equally and the interests of future generations have not been explicitly addressed.
However, for the oil-rich economies the eff ect of corruption on human development is sometimes disguised by oil windfalls used to subsidize these generous social welfare programs. To the extent that the PGOEC are able to continue to develop in the areas of health, education, infrastructure and employment guarantees during boom periods of oil-driven development, few question the conspicuous wealth accumulation of those in power. However, as oil prices fall, development lags and the eff ects of corruption become more prominent, greater tension between the rulers and the general population arises. It is then that the disparity in lifestyles, existence of poverty and lack of equal access to economic opportunities all point to an un-Islamic distribution of oil wealth, especially if the welfare of future generations is not taken into account.
There is of course no direct statistical data available to substantiate these allegations but the mass media more often than not points to visible signs of the excessive and inappropriate use of public funds. In post-invasion Iraq, the number and size of Saddam Hussein's palaces are well documented. In Saudi Arabia, the lavish palaces of the senior Al-Saud princes are numerous, albeit behind very high walls, as are their foreign real estate holdings. In Iran, the income disparity between North and South Teheran as seen in residences and the business and property ownership of those in offi ce is striking. In Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE the opulent, and sometimes ostentatious, lifestyles of the ruling elite are routine fodder for the international media. These excesses, opulent lifestyles and waste, Hossein Askari, Scheherazade Sabina Rehman and Noora Arfaa -9781849806404
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/03/2019 02:07:24AM via free access are incompatible with Islamic teachings and are in sharp contrast to the lifestyles of general population and migrant workers who in some cases account for almost half the population in several of these countries. If these rulers were Western fi nancial chief executive offi cers (CEOs) few would question their right to lavish bonuses. Being the heads of Islamic states, however, puts them in a unique position of being mandated to treat such depletable resources to benefi t all citizens of this and future generations equally. As such, not only is excessive use of oil revenues for amassing personal wealth prohibited, but so are, among others, wasteful economic policies geared towards consumption, subsidies (instead of market and job creation), uncompetitive bidding and procurement contracts, favored business loans and licensing agreements, lack of fi scal and economic transparency, and lack of adequate savings and returns on the oil revenues to protect the interests of future generations. In addition to the corruption associated with natural resources and its treatment in Islam, not unexpectedly other forms of corruption that are traditionally found in other developing countries are also present in the Persian Gulf. As a general rule, while corruption in the more developed countries tends to be generally more subtle, 'camoufl aged' and long term in form, in the oil-exporting countries it tends to be more blatant and immediate ('cash on the barrel head' so to speak). Popular belief among the general public is that corruption is largely associated with economic underdevelopment and rent-seeking behavior, and the correlation of the high degree of political and economic (oil) corruption, in for example Nigeria, and the lack of economic development is well documented and researched. It should be noted that there is also considerably less research on corruption in more developed countries, and if one takes a deeper analytical look at the issues of corruption it becomes apparent that it exists in various forms in all countries, regardless of the level of economic development. Although not all rent-seeking behavior is corrupt, rent-seeking may often entail corrupt practices.
Even in the US, arguably the most industrialized country in the world with the most democratic and transparent system of government, it is relatively easy to point to political considerations that continue to contaminate the quality of economic and fi nancial policies adopted by the US Congress, the White House, and other government agencies. For example, members of Congress, be they Republicans or Democrats, do not make decisions solely on the basis of what is in the interest of the American economy or, for that matter, the rest of the world when applicable, such as in the arena of global warming. They, in part, incorporate into their objective function factors such as winning elections -a task that may involve following through on campaign promises, exchanging political and economic favors Hossein Askari, Scheherazade Sabina Rehman and Noora Arfaa -9781849806404
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/03/2019 02:07:24AM via free access to supporters in exchange for votes or campaign fi nancing support. US politicians accept campaign donations and favors (exotic trips and noncash gifts) in return for support and favorable legislation, which ultimately means fi nancial benefi ts. Individuals also accept political appointments which they in turn and over time transform into fi nancial benefi ts, awarding contracts to companies now with the implicit understanding that they will receive fi nancial benefi ts, such as lucrative employment, in the future (generally referred to as a 'revolving door' in Washington, DC). In the US it is rare, though not unheard of, that a politician will directly accept cash or a bank transfer and directly buy votes. The impact of economic policy decision-making at both the macro and micro levels could be better understood and forecasted if economic models could better capture some of the more subtle forms of corruption and rent-seeking behavior. In many of the oil-exporting countries in the Persian Gulf, as in most impoverished or failed states, subtlety does not seem to be the modus operandi. This was particularly true during the 1980s. Ostentatious jet-setting lifestyles were fi nanced by public oil revenues and other forms of corrupt practices, with little accounting or transparency.
In oil-exporting countries there is an additional twist to corruption. Government contracts are so large by non-oil-exporting developing country standards, income distribution so grossly skewed, and corruption seemingly more pervasive and open so that the average person eventually is discouraged from hard work. For a rational individual the incentive system is turned inside out. Instead of hard work and good investments (but not without risk) as the channels of advancement, the way to success is dependent on how to penetrate and join the circle of corruption and get a piece of the proverbial 'pie' with little or no risk. The 'democratization' of corruption increases with higher levels of poverty and more unequal distribution of incomes. While the poor and marginalized suff er disproportionately from corruption, for those who fall within the system of patronage untold energies are spent on getting to know someone who knows someone who is in a position to help them fi nancially.
Most oil-exporting governments tend to use oil rents to provide employment guarantees in the public sector, leading to often non-value-added jobs with little room for advancement, and often bloated government bureaucracies that serve to entrench systemic corruption further and disenfranchise individual drive and ambition. The PGOEC are no exception. Research suggests that for natural resource-rich countries, the misallocation of talent from productive sectors of the economy to corrupt rent-seeking activities has had a negative impact on overall economic growth. 28 Until the mid-1990s, the eff ort to create non-oil wealth and other revenue streams has been nominal in the PGOEC, for example, the lack Hossein Askari, Scheherazade Sabina Rehman and Noora Arfaa -9781849806404
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/03/2019 02:07:24AM via free access of eff ective income tax systems. It should be noted that while Iran has the only long-standing income tax system in the region, it is largely ineff ective. Corruption (that is, kickbacks, bribes and other corrupt behaviors) serves as an informal tax in the region; however, without the demands of accountability and transparency inherent in a formal system of taxation. After the mid-1990s, many of the governments in the region faced the stark reality that if they did not begin to create reasonably functioning markets and meaningful jobs, their own survival was in jeopardy given the growing discontent in the population over the areas of economic progress and human development. This was in fact giving rise, and more infl uence, to religious leaders who were promising a more even distribution of oil wealth than the ruling elite. This was especially glaring due to the rate of oil depletion and lack of public savings over the last four decades under almost absolute rule in most of these countries. Many of the PGOEC languished rudderless in terms of an economic growth and diversifi cation strategy for almost 30 years and then suddenly realized their lack of foresight. And because the oil revenues had been squandered and savings were proving insuffi cient to fi nance future generations, these governments began to realize the need to draw in foreign investments. Thus began the mega-construction projects in the UAE (in Dubai). Most of the PGOEC followed suit and have now attempted to adopt the elements of the 'Dubai Model' 29 of economic growth, that is, growth through private (domestic and foreign) investment in the service, education and research and development (R&D)-driven sectors after the oil has been depleted. 30 Qatar, for example, has made its move to become a regional hub of higher education. Others, like Saudi Arabia, began to scramble and introduce economic and knowledge cities in the middle of the desert under its 10x10 Program. The goal of the 10x10 Program is to put Saudi Arabia among the world's top ten globally competitive investment destinations by 2010. The 2007-09 global fi nancial meltdown has slowed these attempts to rectify 40 years of regional economic mismanagement and these governments are now again frantically attempting to design ways to pacify a growingly discontented and disillusioned population. This is, however, becoming increasing diffi cult given the global fi nancial crisis and accompanying liquidity crunch and the attendant sharp drop in oil prices and oil revenues.
Measuring Corruption in the Persian Gulf
In this section we attempt to measure the manifestation of corruption in the Persian Gulf oil-exporting countries (PGOEC). We benchmark the PGOEC against a set of non-oil-exporting Islamic countries and major non-Islamic oil-exporting countries. 31 We fi rst view corruption from the Third, we utilize the regulatory environment that controls business and investment as a proxy for the close association between corruption and good business environment and practices. In doing so, the study utilizes the well-known World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index. Fourth, we measure failure of governance (government) and corruption by using the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Lastly, while the linkages between human development and corruption may seem less obvious than the relationship between the business environment or governance and corruption, it has been found that corruption, institutional development and human capital formation are closely linked.
Corruption indices
We use three of the most popular corruption indices: the World Development Indicators Control of Corruption Index (CCI), 32 the International Country Risk Guide's Corruption Index, 33 and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 34 The World Development Indicators Control of Corruption Index (CCI) is part of its overall Worldwide Governance Indicators. 35 The Control of Corruption Index 'measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.' 36 The International Country Risk Guide's Corruption Index focuses on political-level corruption, for over 100 countries, with a long time series. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures 'the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given country and is a composite index, drawing on diff erent expert and business surveys. The index scores 180 countries on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten (highly clean).' 37 In Table 1 .5, we summarize the three key corruption indicators from 1996 to 2008.
Looking at all three corruption indicators in rank and the ICRG index, corruption is on average higher in the Islamic oil-exporting (PGOEC) countries, followed closely by the Islamic nonoil-exporting group of countries; whereas according to the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index, corruption is on average higher amongst the Islamic non-oil-exporting countries, followed by the PGOECs. However, perception of corruption in the Islamic oil-exporting countries is less than that in the three developing oil-exporting countries (Mexico, Russia and Venezuela). Iraq, followed by Venezuela, is the most corrupt country in the study, while the Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway are the least corrupt. 41 have each developed an index, Economic Freedom in the World and the Index of Economic Freedom, respectively, to measure the extent to which policies and institutions are aligned with regards to the imperatives to economic freedom. While again these are not direct indicators of corruption per se, they do consider the various dimension of economic freedom which includes corruption. Table 1 .7 shows a snapshot of Civil and Political Rights and Economic Freedom Indicators from 1995 to 2007 for the 18 countries in our study. Table 1 .8 shows that on average in the oil-exporting non-Islamic group of countries there is a higher degree of political and civil freedom, followed by the non-oil exporters. On economic freedoms, with the exception of Russia and Venezuela, the oil-exporting non-Islamic group again rank amongst the most free, followed by the Persian Gulf oil exporters. That is to say, that while the institutions in major oil-exporting countries in the Persian Gulf may allow a relatively moderate degree of economic freedom, they are weak in terms of providing for basic political and civil liberties.
Business environment index
In recent years, there has been an increasing appreciation of the linkages between the quality of institutions, governance, business or investment climate and economic growth. Although sound macro-level economic policies are critical to economic development, institutional and regulatory factors may have an even more fundamental impact on prosperity. A direct result of good governance is an attractive business climate that encourages investment, provides incentives for private sector development, and creates jobs, thereby setting in motion new potentialities for economic growth. The World Bank's 2005 World Development Report (WDR) echoes this idea that enhancing the investment climate must be a principal feature of any sustainable development agenda. 42 Moreover, there is clear evidence suggesting that there is a close association between corruption Non-Islamic Oil Exporters Canada and the regulatory environment that controls business and investment. For instance, a number of studies have found that countries with a heavier regulatory burden for business entry tend also to have signifi cantly higher levels of corruption, in addition to larger informal economies and poorquality public and private goods. 43 To some extent government regulations that impose barriers to business formation are enacted to give public officials the authority to demand and extract bribes, and as such tend to fuel corruption. 44 Thus deregulation, coupled with mechanisms of transparency and accountability, may serve to limit abuse by public offi cials.
The question that naturally follows is how a country's business or investment climate should be measured. There are a number of crosscountry datasets including the World Bank's Doing Business indicators, which measure business regulations and their enforcement across 181 economies. Broadly, these indicators measure the regulatory costs of business and can be used to analyze specifi c regulations that enhance or constrain investment, productivity and growth in terms of the overall ease of doing business in a particular economy, based on a number of factors including the cost of doing business, and regulations on licensing, contract, employment and trade.
In our study we use the World Bank's widely used Doing Business indicators. In doing so we see that the PGOEC have a number of distortions and ineffi ciencies at the fi rm level, particularly in terms of the cost, time and number of procedures associated with: (1) starting a business; (2) dealing with licenses; (3) international trade; and (4) closing businesses. Paying Taxes (-0.69) were also found to be correlated with corruption (based on the Control of Corruption percentile rank). That is to say, those economies that scored poorly in terms of the ease of doing business, such as Iran, Iraq, Senegal and Venezuela, also have relatively high levels of corruption. However, we also found that the corruption was not an accurate predictor of the other dimensions of the business environment (that is, starting a business and labor regulations).
Good governance
Most observers agree that, ultimately, widespread corruption is a sign of failure in governance. In most countries the common modalities of corruption, such as fraud, embezzlement, and the paying and receiving of bribes, are considered illegal. However, the issue of governance arises where governments fail to draw the legal line on what may be seen as borderline issues, such as state control of natural resources or limiting free-market mechanisms, where a select group may have disproportionate infl uence over public policy formulation. 45 In some instances, the incidence of outright fraud or bribery may be low; however, ownership rights to public resources, such as oil in the case of the oil-exporting countries, may still not be adequately addressed by the regulatory or legal system.
Corruption has a tendency to gain momentum when it is out of public view and benefi ts only a small group; it is, as expected, threatened by mechanisms that are the hallmark of 'good governance' -transparency, accountability and inclusiveness. In resource-rich countries, corruption tends to translate to special access to natural resources, denying the wider population access to the country's wealth. Corruption within the ruling elite manifests itself as the desire to insure self-preservation as government leaders. And generally, institutions of governance are designed to promote and protect this objective. Their role as public servants in the fi rst instance, in fact, factors little into the public policy decision-making process. In this sense, they are practicing perhaps the highest form of corruption that can be more adequately captured through a broader set of governance indicators, such as voice and accountability, political stability, government eff ectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law. Establishing mechanisms for good governance is a necessary step towards reducing corruption and sustaining some of the positive gains for political, socio-economic development. Ultimately, governments determine the allocation of societies' resources (including oil) via mechanisms of governance. See Table 1 .10, World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2007 by rank.
46 Table 1 .10 shows that mechanisms that ensure voice and accountability, rule of law and regulatory quality are particularly weak amongst the Islamic oil exporters, with the exception of political stability. On voice and accountability, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia rank amongst the lowest of the 18 countries in our study in terms of the extent to which their citizens are able to engage in the political process. It should be noted that in comparison to most other countries in our study, there is little evidence that much progress has occurred over the last decade in the Islamic oilexporting countries adequately to establish modalities essential for good governance.
Human Development Index
While the linkages between human development and corruption may seem less obvious than the relationship between the business environment or governance and corruption, many have actually found that corruption, institutional development and human capital formation are closely linked. For instance, education is essential to the development of an eff ective judicial system or for any other public institutions for that matter. Similarly, misuse of public funds by the government is more likely if a large portion of the population is uneducated or illiterate.
47 See Table 1 .11 for the United Nations' key Human Development Indicators.
Although not illustrated in variables included in the human development composite index) 48 tends to be more advanced than that of the non-oil-exporting countries in the region. However, the overall impact of corruption on human development in the MENA is diffi cult to support based on empirical evidence due to the dearth of relevant data and studies. As mentioned previously, in the oil-rich economies the eff ect of corruption on human development tends to be hidden as oil windfalls are used to subsidize generous social welfare programs in order to buy the support of the citizenry.
Of the three country groupings, the non-oil exporters on average have experienced lower levels of human development. Senegal and Morocco have the lowest life expectancy rate (with the exception of Russia), the highest infant mortality rate, the lowest youth and adult literacy rates, and the lowest HDI (Human Development Index) value.
On other specifi c measures of human development, Figures 1.9 and 1.10 shed some light on the association between corruption and HDI value, and corruption and life expectancy. Correlations between corruption and all the variables that make up the HDI suggest that countries with a high HDI value and a high life expectancy also have lower levels of corruption, whereas there is little association between corruption and the other three variables in the HDI composite. Based on the scatter diagram in Figure  1 .9, we can see that the non-Islamic oil exporters fall on either end of the extreme of the diagram, illustrating that these countries tend to have either high levels of corruption and a relatively low HDI value or vice versa; and for the PGOECs, HDI levels decrease almost uniformly as corruption levels increase (low on the Control of Corruption -CC -percentile rank). A very similar trend is seen in Figure 1 .9 where for the PGOEC there appears to be a linear association between corruption and life expectancy; and the non-Islamic oil exporters tend to lie on either extreme with very low life expectancy and high corruption in some countries, or vice versa for others.
CONCLUSION
Overall the major oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf do not display a signifi cantly higher level of perceived corruption than a comparable group of Islamic non-oil-exporting countries; and their perceived corruption level is somewhat lower than that for three selected developing oil-exporting countries chosen from outside the region. When we, however, look at some individual measurements such as the poor business environment, and weak mechanisms for good governance, we fi nd manifestations of corruption are evident in oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf. While oil reserves were plentiful, oil revenues could simultaneously subsidize the population, fi nance basic economic development and reward the ruling elite. This was particularly true of the richer countries of the Persian Gulf. This, however, is not sustainable in the longer term and only possible as long as the oil lasts and oil prices are high. Oil-enabled methods of governance are not sustainable because natural resources will be depleted over time and will eventually run out. Even while the oil lasts, short-run fl uctuations in oil prices cause enormous problems for Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq given that they have not adequately structured policies to provide for oil revenue fl uctuations. One solution is to adopt better governance and policies to achieve higher levels of sustained growth. Given the 2007-09 global crises coupled with the economic, social and political track record over the last 40 years, the political survival of some of these governments is now being called into question. 
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